By Anthony
Davis
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia)
The armies separated; and, it is
said, Pyrrhus replied to one that gave him joy of
his victory that one more such victory would
utterly undo him. For he had lost a great part of
the forces he brought with him, and... there were
no others there to make recruits. -
Plutarch
The apparently relentless
advance of the Myanmar military eastwards towards
the town of Laiza, headquarters of the insurgent
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), has involved some
of the heaviest sustained fighting in the country
since independence in 1948.
Predictably,
international news coverage has focused on two
salient elements of the conflict: the sheer weight
of force, including newly acquired air-power,
brought to bear by the government; and the yawning
gulf between the conciliatory
statements emanating from
the office of President Thein Sein and the actions
of the military, or Tatmadaw, on the ground .
However, reports of air-strikes and
cease-fires-that-never-happened have tended to
obscure another less obvious but arguably more
important aspect of the war: the striking
battlefield failings and losses of the Tatmadaw,
which over the past 20 years has benefited from
the lion's share of government spending, a
dramatic increase in manpower and a
transformational modernization of its weaponry.
Pitting a conventional army equipped with
artillery, armor and air-power against guerrilla
forces attempting to defend a fixed position, the
battle for Laiza should have been nasty, brutish
and short. In the event, it unfolded as a
drawn-out, meat-grinder campaign which at best
marks a painfully pyrrhic victory for the
government.
At worst, the costly failures
of the war in Kachin state - and they are probably
not yet over - will have significant political
repercussions in addition to the substantial
military losses incurred. Both in terms of the
future relations between the central government
and the armed ethnic minorities, and no less
importantly the standing of the military as a
national institution, the battle for Laiza and the
Kachin war more generally may well mark a
watershed in the nation's politics.
Targeted broadly at the KIA's Laiza
headquarters on the Chinese border, the Tatmadaw
campaign, code-named "Operation Thunderbolt",
appears to have been aimed either at bludgeoning
the insurgents back to the cease-fire agreement
which collapsed in June 2011, or, failing that,
decapitating the KIA by neutralizing its command
center and logistics hub in a manner that would
permit a declaration of victory over its scattered
residual forces.
After a year-and-a-half
of mounting government losses in Kachin state, the
offensive also reflected real impatience in the
upper echelons of the Tatmadaw over both the
intransigence of the KIA - estimated to field a
main force of some 7,000 to 10,000 fighters - and
the prospect of an open-ended guerrilla war.
The insurgents' political wing, the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO), has made any
renewed cease-fire conditional on the promise of
politically substantive, national-level
negotiations between the government and the ethnic
minorities. Such a position almost certainly
implies significant changes to the
military-scripted, centralist constitution of
2008.
An optimum scenario for the both
government and Tatmadaw would have been a KIO
decision last year to renew the cease-fire. But it
was also clear that contingency planning and
preparations for a major offensive in the current
dry season (November- April) - which also served
to increase psychological pressure on the Kachins
- were in train since at least early 2012.
In March, the Tatmadaw staged a major
divisional-level exercise near Meiktila in central
Myanmar. Attended by commander-in-chief Vice
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the exercise
involved all 10 battalions of the Meiktila-based
99th Light Infantry Division, supported by armored
and artillery units, while reportedly using a
command post sand-table modeled on the Laiza area.
Significantly, the usually secretive military
ensured the war-games were given wide media
coverage, not least on television.
In
April, the military began a protracted build-up of
forces deployed in the northern regional command
area, moving men, armor and artillery north both
by rail to the Kachin state capital at Myitkyina,
north of the Laiza area of operations, and by boat
up the Irrawaddy river to Bhamo, to the south.
Aviation assets, notably light strike jets and a
range of helicopters including the Air Force's new
Mi-35 Hind-E gunships, were forward-based at
Myitkyina, a few minutes flying time from Laiza.
Almost certainly the largest single operational
build-up in the history of the Tatmadaw, these
deployments were closely monitored by the KIA,
which saw them as a direct threat.
Significantly, the bulk of the manpower
reinforcements were from light infantry divisions
(LIDs). Well-trained mobile formations, of which
the Tatmadaw fields 10, these divisions operate
independently of various regional commands and
essentially constitute a large strategic reserve
force answering direct to the War Office in
Naypyidaw.
Battalions from the 33rd, 66th,
88th, 99th and 101st LIDs - none of which are
home-based in Kachin State - are now operating
under a theater-level Bureau of Strategic
Operations in Myitkyina, headed by Lieutenant
General Myint Soe. A tactical military operations
command (MOC 21) overseeing the Laiza campaign
specifically is based at Bhamo and headed by
northern region commander Brigadier General Tun
Tun Naung.
Despite this build-up, the KIA
failed to blink and the Operation Thunderbolt
offensive around Laiza began in mid-December.
Since then, one of the most noteworthy aspects of
the war has been the striking disconnect between
the nine-month lead-time for planning and
preparations enjoyed by the Tatmadaw command on
the one hand, and the tactically disjointed and
frequently inept execution of operations on the
other.
Particularly in its opening phases,
Operation Thunderbolt, touted in advance as an
exercise in "shock and awe", might more accurately
have been dubbed "Operation Heavy Drizzle".
Tactical confusion
Broadly, the
battle for Laiza unfolded as two overlapping
phases in different sectors of the area of
operations. Opening on December 14, the first
phase focused squarely on the area around Laja
Yang. Often described as the gateway to Laiza,
Laja Yang is a cluster of villages just north of
the Tapin river astride the main two-lane highway
between Myitkyina and Bhamo. At the northern end
of the bridge across the river, a turn-off from
the highway leads east along the Tapin valley
leads towards the Chinese border and the KIA
headquarters some 15 kilometers away.
From
December 14, it was immediately apparent that an
army with significant conventional capabilities
had neither a plan nor the assets to launch a
concerted offensive up the most direct axis of
advance to Laiza and the Chinese border. Typically
this would have involved a combined-arms operation
involving armor and mechanised infantry, preceded
by artillery bombardments and air-strikes and
backed by close air support, breaking through
Kachin defences at Laja Yang and pushing as
rapidly as possible along the Tapin valley to the
border.
Such a thrust would have posed a
direct threat to the KIA's nerve-center while at
the same time splitting the insurgents'
Laiza-based 3rd Brigade from their 5th Brigade
based near Maija Yang on the Chinese border to the
south.
This would have been the "shock and
awe" option. Indeed, it is difficult to exaggerate
the impact of such a combined-arms advance
involving intense fire-power along a relatively
narrow corridor of advance, particularly against
lightly-armed guerrillas. As this writer witnessed
during Soviet offensives in Afghanistan's Panjshir
valley in the 1980s, the combination of armor and
mechanised infantry backed by air-strikes and
low-flying helicopter gunships is both unnerving
and generally decisive.
Rather than
seizing the initiative in the battle for Laiza,
however, the Tatmadaw appeared to back into the
fighting in tactical confusion and with a striking
lack of preparation. Reports indicate that the
fighting on December 14 escalated as government
forces attempted to resupply posts in the Laja
Yang area and were then ambushed in strength. On
that day alone, the KIA claimed the government had
lost 50 dead, a figure which, even if exaggerated,
suggests significant casualties.
Despite
the swift commitment of air-strikes, the fighting
at Laja Yang then bogged down in protracted,
piece-meal engagements that remarkably lasted
until January 24, when government forces
eventually secured the area after taking control
of the high ground on both sides of the valley.
Despite relatively flat terrain, it appears armor
was never seriously committed.
The second phase of the campaign
began around New Year. Blocked on the most direct
axis of advance to Laiza, Tatmadaw forces began
pushing into the KIA's rugged mountain redoubt to
the north and east of Laja Yang. This
multi-pronged advance then became by default the
focus of operations and involved a series of
bitter, meat-grinder contests for the various
heights on which the KIA was dug in. As they
inched forward, Tatmadaw infantry came to rely
less on air power and increasingly on intense
bombardments from 105mm artillery and 120mm
mortars.
The first key height to fall was
Bumre Bum (feature 771) on January 3, followed by
the Tibet Post and the Wai Maw Post. From these
features, government forces moved into the Hka Ya
Hkyet valley then launched a brutal uphill assault
on the high ground of Hka Ya Bum. Under heavy
artillery fire, the KIA were
finally forced to withdraw
from Hka Ya Bum on January 26, bringing Tatmadaw
forces to positions effectively dominating Laiza
town.
Curiously, the government advance on
Laiza played to the few advantages the KIA enjoyed
in an otherwise entirely unequal contest: intimate
knowledge of the terrain, initial control of the
heights and far shorter lines of communication and
resupply. For this, the Tatmadaw evidently paid
heavily in term of casualties. According to one
well-placed local analyst, the capture of Hka Ya
Bum cost over 120 government dead and nearly 400
wounded.
The second surprise in the Laiza
campaign was the Tatmadaw's failure to exploit
air-power effectively. While repeated sorties by
both jets and helicopters marked a sharp
escalation of the war and attracted widespread
international criticism, Kachin reports suggest
the actual battlefield impact was fairly
ineffectual. Indeed, by the second week in January
there was a clear shift away from the near-daily
air strikes seen earlier in favor of sustained
artillery bombardments - which certainly did have
a lethal effect.
The lack of effective air
support is likely to have stemmed from two
factors. First, close tactical coordination
between front-line ground forces and supporting
air assets is critical, particularly in rugged,
wooded terrain where the lines are often fluid and
difficult to see from the air. The nature and
location of the air strikes suggests this
coordination was inadequate, if not entirely
lacking. Unconfirmed reports of a friendly fire
incident in December at Pangwa to the north of
Laiza, where Mi-35s were first committed, may have
contributed to uncertainty in operations near
Laiza.
The second factor is the altitude
at which air support assets are prepared to
operate. Video footage from the battlefield
invariably showed both jets and helicopters
bombing and rocketing from considerable altitude
and suggests that Tatmadaw close air support (CAS)
was in fact never that close. It also appears that
many air strikes were directed at suspected KIA
positions well behind the front lines. As a
result, the local forests and wild life appears to
have suffered far more damage than the Kachin
insurgents.
Fear of ground-fire may also
have pushed inexperienced pilots to higher
altitudes. But the 12.7mm heavy machine-guns
fielded by the Kachin pose only a minor threat to
fast-flying jets and heavily-armored,
titanium-bellied Mi-35 gunships; and losses were
in any case slight. Battlefield reports indicated
that one Mi-8 helicopter was damaged on December
14 and seen flying back to Myitkyina trailing
smoke. On January 11, both sides confirmed the
crash of an Mi-35 over KIA territory.
According to the government, the loss was
the result of mechanical failure rather than
ground-fire, an account which is entirely credible
given the Mi-35's capacity to absorb small-arms
fire on the one hand and servicing by newly
trained, inexperienced ground crew on the other.
Video footage shot on December 31 or January 1 and
aired in international news broadcasts also
appeared to show one K-8 jet hit by ground fire,
catching fire, and dropping in a vertical,
uncontrolled descent. But this loss, if indeed
there was one, was never confirmed by either side.
Given the failure to use either armor or
airpower effectively, it is extremely unlikely
that Tatmadaw commanders even contemplated the
possibility of air assault operations - the use of
helicopters to insert company or even
battalion-sized infantry forces behind enemy
lines. A regular and highly effective feature of
Soviet, and to a lesser extent, US
counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, the
tactic permits attacks on enemy positions from the
rear, cuts lines of communication and supply, and,
not least, sows panic and confusion in enemy
ranks.
Low military morale
While
incomplete, the evidence emerging over the past
month from Laiza suggests strongly that the
Tatmadaw is still an army coming to grips with
modern war-fighting. A force that has rapidly
acquired a wide array of new equipment including
armor, artillery, helicopters and jets, it has yet
to develop the doctrine, training, logistical
support capabilities or operational experience
required to use them. In short, the Tatmadaw is
still fighting its last major war, which took
place over 20 years ago and was quintessentially
about light infantry and artillery.
The
difficulties of integrating and adapting to new
equipment have undoubtedly been compounded by
persistent problems of manpower and morale.
Despite the rapid expansion of the military's
order of battle over the past two decades, it is
no secret that Tatmadaw units in the field are
woefully undermanned, underpaid and
under-supported.
Battalions that typically
should number 700 or more troops divided into
three or four companies are in the Tatmadaw the
size of reinforced companies at best, generally
with 200-250 men or less. Unsurprisingly, reports
from international human rights organizations of
forced recruitment and the use of child soldiers
emerge from this terrain.
Equally
unsurprising is that higher than acceptable
desertion rates have been a focus of documented
concern within the Tatmadaw command for years. An
internal document obtained by IHS-Jane's in 2007
pinpointed false reporting, haphazard inspections
and poor record-keeping as chronic problems, while
battalion commanders were criticized for excessive
drinking, womanizing, and pursuing private
business activities. Morale among enlisted ranks
was low, noted the document, contributing to high
rates of desertion.
The spiralling human
cost of the war can only exacerbate problems of
morale and desertion. According to statistics
released on pro-government blog-sites, between
June 2011 and early December at least 5,000 troops
were killed in Kachin state - or more than the
combined total of US combat deaths (4,977) in over
a decade of war in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Laiza campaign will have contributed a grim
addition of several hundred more to that number.
By any standards, such a toll in 19 months
of essentially guerrilla conflict is a sobering
statistic. While much of the carnage speaks to the
resilience and determination of the KIA, there can
also be no doubt that shortcomings in Tatmadaw
equipment, training, competence and morale are
also responsible.
Video footage posted on
YouTube in the aftermath of a December ambush of a
government convoy on the Bhamo-Myitkyina road
provided a bleak insight into this situation.
Bodies of dead Tatmadaw troops lie scattered in
and around small, burnt-out pick-up trucks: after
a year-and-a-half of war, armoured vehicles are
nowhere to be seen.
Short of agreeing to
national-level negotiations with the still-loose
ethnic alliance of the United Nationalities
Federation Council (of which the KIO is a member),
it remains unclear how the Tatmadaw can extricate
itself from the Kachin quagmire. A KIA call for a
renewed cease-fire is probably less likely after
the capture or neutralization of Laiza than it
might have been before. Indeed, the most likely
short-term scenario is a reversion to classic
guerrilla tactics including the possibility of
urban attacks and sabotage beyond Kachin state.
Entirely clear, however, is that the
Tatmadaw's operational performance will have been
monitored by other armed minority groups. In
notable contrast to the military's swift foray
into the Kokang Special region in August 2009, the
Kachin war will almost certainly embolden rather
than intimidate other ethnic guerrilla outfits.
This is especially true of the Wa, based along the
Chinese border in northeastern Shan state.
Fielding 20,000 regular troops backed by
local militia forces, the United Wa State Army is
over twice the size of the KIA, generally better
trained and certainly better equipped. Since the
Tatmadaw takeover of Kokang, it has upgraded an
already impressive arsenal, not least with new
armored vehicles and Chinese HN-5 series
man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). It is
also closely allied to the National Democratic
Alliance Army in eastern Shan State and more
loosely with the Shan State Army-North.
Given that the military and political
costs of the Kachin conflict would be dwarfed by a
war against this powerful insurgent combine, any
major new Tatmadaw campaigns in eastern Shan State
in the coming three years are virtually
inconceivable. From the perspective of the Wa and
other ethnic forces, the Tatmadaw may now be seen
as a giant with feet of clay. The implications for
negotiations over Myanmar's new political shape
are likely to be profound.
Anthony
Davis is a Bangkok-based security analyst for
IHS-Jane's.
(Copyright 2013 Asia Times
Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about sales, syndication and
republishing.)
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http://www.first-11.com
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| Written by ေနထြန္းႏိုင္
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Monday, 21 January 2013 10:43 |
KIA စစ္သားတစ္ဦး၏ နာေရးအခမ္းအနား မတိုင္မီ ေတြ႔ရေသာ KIA စစ္သားႏွစ္ဦးအား ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၃၁ ရက္ေန႔က ေတြ႔ရစဥ္။
(၇)
ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက္ေန႔ မြန္းလြဲပိုင္းေက်ာ္ခ်ိန္မွာေတာ့ တ႐ုတ္ႏိုင္ငံထဲကို
ေရာက္ခဲ့ပါၿပီ။ အခ်ိန္တစ္နာရီေက်ာ္ေလာက္ သြားၿပီးခ်ိန္မွာ ကူယံုးၿမိဳ႕ကို
ေရာက္ပါတယ္။ ဒီၿမိဳ႕လြန္ရင္ေတာ့ ေမွာင္ခိုလမ္းကို အသံုးျပဳၿပီး လိုင္ဇာကို
ခရီးဆက္ရမွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ကူယံုးမွာ ခဏနားမယ္လို႔ တ႐ုတ္ယာဥ္ေမာင္းက
ေျပာပါတယ္။ ေမွာင္ခိုလမ္းမွာ ရဲေတြေရာက္ေနလို႔ ရဲရွင္းမွ
ဆက္သြားႏိုင္မယ္လို႔ သူကဆက္ေျပာပါတယ္။
ကူယံုးလြန္ၿပီး သိပ္မၾကာခင္မွာ ေမွာင္ခိုလမ္းကို ျဖတ္ရပါတယ္။
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ကိုင္ေဆာင္ထားတဲ့ နယ္စပ္ျဖတ္ေက်ာ္ခြင့္ လက္မွတ္ဆိုတာ
ထိန္ခ်ံဳး-ေရႊလီ အစရွိတဲ့ တယ္ဟုန္တိုင္းအတြင္းထဲပဲ ျဖတ္သန္းခြင့္ရွိပါတယ္။
ကန္ပိုက္တီးကေန ရင္က်န္း၊ ေရႊလီ သြားသူတိုင္း ေမွာင္ခိုလမ္းကို ျဖတ္ရပါတယ္။
အေ၀းေျပးလမ္းမေပၚမွာ ရွိေနတဲ့ လူ၀င္မႈၾကီးၾကပ္ေရး႐ံုးကို
ေက်ာ္ျဖတ္ဖို႔အတြက္ ေမွာင္ခိုလမ္းကို အသံုးျပဳခဲ့ရတာပါ။
လူ၀င္မႈႀကီးၾကပ္ေရး႐ံုးက ေပါက္ဆန္းခ႐ိုင္ ျဖတ္သန္းခြင့္ကို စိစစ္တာ
ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ေပါက္ဆန္းခ႐ိုင္ကို တ႐ုတ္ႏိုင္ငံသားေတြပဲ ျဖတ္သန္းခြင့္
ရွိပါတယ္။ ေပါက္ဆန္းခ႐ိုင္ လူ၀င္မႈႀကီးၾကပ္ေရး႐ံုးကို ေက်ာ္ႏိုင္ဖို႔
ေမွာင္ခိုလမ္းကို သံုးရတာပါ။ ေမွာင္ခိုလမ္းက ႏွစ္ခုရွိပါတယ္။ တစ္ခုက သစ္၊
ေက်ာက္စိမ္း အစရွိတာေတြကို ခိုးထုတ္တဲ့ ေတာလမ္းျဖစ္ျပီး ေနာက္တစ္လမ္းက
တ႐ုတ္-ရွမ္းေတြ ေနထိုင္တဲ့ ေက်းရြာအတြင္း လမ္းေလွ်ာက္ျဖတ္သန္းရတာ
ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ယာဥ္ေမာင္းက ေတာလမ္းကို ေရြးခ်ယ္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။
ဒီဇင္ဘာ ၂၈ ရက္ ည ၇ နာရီေက်ာ္ခ်ိန္မွာ ရင္က်န္းကို ေရာက္ပါတယ္။
လိုင္ဇာကို ဆက္သြားဖို႔အတြက္ ပံုမွန္ေျပးဆြဲေနတဲ့ လိုင္းကားေတြ မရွိေတာ့တဲ့
အခ်ိန္မို႔ ကားငွားၿပီး သြားရပါတယ္။ ည ၁၀ နာရီ ၀န္းက်င္အခ်ိန္မွာ လိုင္ဇာ
(တ႐ုတ္ဘက္ျခမ္း) ကို ေရာက္ပါတယ္။ လိုင္ဇာ (တ႐ုတ္ဘက္ျခမ္း) က
တ႐ုတ္လူ၀င္မႈႀကီးၾကပ္ေရးမွဴး႐ံုး ပိတ္သြားၿပီမို႔ တ႐ုတ္ဘက္ျခမ္းမွာပဲ
တစ္ညအိပ္ဖို႔ ဆံုးျဖတ္လိုက္ပါတယ္။
(၈)
ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂၉ ရက္ေန႔၊ နံနက္ပိုင္းမွာေတာ့ လိုင္ဇာကို
ေျခခ်ႏိုင္ခဲ့ပါၿပီ။ KIO က ဖြင့္ထားတဲ့ လူ၀င္မႈၾကီးၾကပ္ေရးဌာန
ေရာက္ခ်ိန္မွာ "ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔က ဘယ္သူေတြလဲ" ဆိုတဲ့ ေမးခြန္းကို တာ၀န္က် KIA
စစ္သားတစ္ဦးက ေမးပါတယ္။ "ဂ်ာနယ္လစ္ေတြ၊ ရန္ကုန္က လာခဲ့တာပါ။ ဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီး
ဂ်ီးေနာင္ဆီကို ဖုန္းဆက္ထားပါတယ္" လို႔ ေျပာၿပီးခ်ိန္မွာ ခဏေစာင့္ဖို႔
ေျပာပါတယ္။ ခဏအၾကာမွာ KIA စစ္ဗိုလ္တစ္ဦး ေရာက္လာခဲ့ပါတယ္။
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ကို ဘယ္သူေတြလဲလို႔ ထပ္ေမးပါတယ္။ မူလက ေျပာခဲ့တဲ့အတိုင္း
ဂ်ာနယ္လစ္ေတြပါ၊ ဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီး ဂ်ီးေနာင္ကို အေၾကာင္းၾကားထားပါတယ္လို႔
ထပ္ေျပာလိုက္ပါတယ္။ "ဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီး ဂ်ီးေနာင္တို႔ အစည္းအေ၀းလုပ္ေနတယ္" လို႔
သူက ျပန္ေျပာပါတယ္။ ေနာက္ၿပီး ျမစ္ႀကီးနားဟိုတယ္-၂ ကို လိုက္ပို႔ပါတယ္။
လိုင္ဇာကို ေရာက္ရွိခ်ိန္မွာေတာ့ လက္နက္ႀကီးက်သံေတြကို ဆက္တိုက္နီးပါး
ၾကားလာရပါတယ္။
ျမစ္ႀကီးနားဟိုတယ္ကို ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ေရာက္သြားခ်ိန္အထိ KIO ဘက္က
ဘာမွတုံ႔ျပန္တာ မရွိေသးပါဘူး။ ဟိုတယ္မွာပဲ ေစာင့္ခိုင္းထားပါတယ္။
လိုင္ဇာၿမိဳ႕တြင္း အေျခအေန သိရဖို႔ အျပင္ထြက္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ လိုင္ဇာေခ်ာင္းနံေဘး
ေရထြက္ေပါက္ေတြမွာ ၀င္ေရာက္ခိုလံႈေနတဲ့ လိုင္ဇာၿမိဳ႕ခံေတြ၊ ကေလးေတြကို
ျမင္ေတြ႕ရပါတယ္။ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက္ေန႔က လိုင္ဇာၿမိဳ႕ေပၚ ပ်ံ၀ဲၿပီး
လဂ်ားယန္ကို ပစ္ခတ္သြားတဲ့ တပ္မေတာ္တိုက္ေလယာဥ္ေတြကို ထိတ္လန္႔ေနပံု
ရပါတယ္။ လိုင္ဇာကို ေလေၾကာင္းတိုက္ခိုက္မႈ လုပ္လိမ့္မယ္ဆိုတဲ့ ေကာလာဟလက
ပ်ံ႕ႏွံ႔ေနပါတယ္။
လိုင္ဇာမေနာကြင္းနား ေရာက္ခ်ိန္မွာ KIO ျပန္ၾကားေရးဌာနက ထုတ္ျပန္ထားတဲ့
ေၾကညာခ်က္ေတြကို ျပထားတဲ့ ေၾကာ္ျငာဘုတ္ေတြကို ေတြ႕ရပါတယ္။ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္
ဇြန္လမွာ တိုက္ပြဲေတြ ဘာေၾကာင့္ျဖစ္ခဲ့ရတယ္။ သူတို႔ဘာေၾကာင့္
စစ္တိုက္ေနရတယ္။ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရး ေဆြးေႏြးဖို႔အတြက္ ဘယ္လိုေတြ
လုပ္ေဆာင္ခဲ့တယ္။ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးေဆြးေႏြးပြဲမွာ ဘာေတြကို ေဆြးေႏြးခဲ့တယ္
အစရွိတာေတြအျပင္ ဘိန္းျဖဴေရာင္းခ်တဲ့အတြက္ ဖမ္းဆီးထိန္းသိမ္းခဲ့သူေတြရဲ႕
သတင္း၊ ဓာတ္ပံုေတြကိုလည္း ျပသထားခဲ့ပါတယ္။
လိုင္ဇာဟိုတယ္အနီးကို ျပန္ေရာက္ခ်ိန္မွာ KIA ျပန္ၾကားေရး အရာရွိတစ္ဦးက
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ကိုေခၚၿပီး ေတြ႕ပါတယ္။ "ဘာေၾကာင့္ လိုင္ဇာကို ေရာက္လာခဲ့သလဲ"
ဆိုတာကို ေမးပါတယ္။ "လိုင္ဇာမွာ သတင္းယူဖို႔ ဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီး ဂ်ီးေနာင္နဲ႔
ဆက္သြယ္ထားပါတယ္" လို႔ ေျပာေတာ့ သူက "ဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီး ဂ်ီးေနာင္နဲ႔
ေတြ႕ၿပီးရင္ ျပန္မွာလား" လို႔ ေမးပါတယ္။ "တိုက္ပြဲအေျခအေနေတြကို
သတင္းယူခ်င္ပါေသးတယ္" လို႔ ျပန္ေျပာလိုက္ပါတယ္။ ဓာတ္ပံုတစ္ပံု၊
မွတ္ပံုတင္မိတၱဴနဲ႔ သတင္းေထာက္ကတ္ မိတၱဴလိုခ်င္ပါတယ္လို႔ ေျပာပါတယ္။
လိုင္ဇာၿမိဳ႕ထဲကို ေရာက္လာတဲ့ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔အတြက္ သူတို႔မွာ တာ၀န္ရွိတယ္။
Press Card ထုတ္ေပးမယ္။ လိုအပ္တာေတြ စီစဥ္ေပးမယ္။ သူတို႔ ထုတ္ေပးတဲ့ Press
Card မရွိဘူးဆိုရင္ေတာ့ ျဖစ္လာတဲ့ ျပႆနာေတြကို သူတို႔ တာ၀န္မယူႏိုင္ဘူးလို႔
ေျပာပါတယ္။ Press Card လုပ္ဖို႔အတြက္ ရွင္းျပတာေတြကို ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔
လက္ခံလိုက္ပါတယ္။ ဟိုတယ္မွာျပန္ၿပီး ေစာင့္ေနပါ။ သူျပန္ၿပီး ဆက္သြယ္မယ္လို႔
ေျပာခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ဒီလိုနဲ႔ ဟိုတယ္ကို ျပန္ခဲ့ၾကပါတယ္။ အခ်ိန္ေတာ္ေတာ္
ၾကာတဲ့အထိ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ကို ျပန္ၿပီး ဆက္သြယ္မလာပါဘူး။ ျပႆနာတစ္ခုခု
ျဖစ္ေနၿပီလားဆိုတဲ့ အေတြးက ၀င္လာပါတယ္။
(၉)
ပံုမွန္အားျဖင့္ေတာ့ လိုင္ဇာကိုလာတဲ့ ဂ်ာနယ္လစ္တိုင္းက ေရႊလီဘက္က
လာၾကတာပါ။ ျမစ္ႀကီးနား-ကန္ပိုက္တီး လမ္းဘက္က လာေလ့မရွိပါဘူး။
ျမစ္ႀကီးနား-ကန္ပိုက္တီး လမ္းဘက္က ၀င္လာတဲ့ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ေတြကို သူတို႔ဘက္က
ယံုၾကည္ပံု မရွိပါဘူး။ ေနာက္တစ္ခ်က္က စစ္ရွိန္ျမင့္တဲ့အခ်ိန္မွာ
ေရာက္လာျခင္းပါ။ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ဘယ္သူေတြလဲဆိုတာ သိဖို႔အတြက္ သူတို႔ဘက္က
စိစစ္မႈကို အခ်ိန္အေတာ္ၾကာ လုပ္လိုက္ရပါတယ္။
မြန္းလြဲ တစ္နာရီေက်ာ္ခ်ိန္မွာေတာ့ KIA ျပန္ၾကားေရးဗိုလ္ႀကီး
ျပန္ေရာက္လာခဲ့ပါတယ္။ သူ႔လက္ထဲမွာ Press Card ေတြ ကိုင္လာပါတယ္။
စိတ္သက္သာရာ ရသြားပါတယ္။ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔အေၾကာင္း ျမစ္ႀကီးနားကိုေရာ၊
ရန္ကုန္ဘက္ကိုပါ လွမ္းစံုစမ္းၿပီးၿပီလို႔ သူက ထုတ္ေျပာခဲ့ပါတယ္။
ေစာင့္ေနရတဲ့အတြက္ ေတာင္းပန္ေၾကာင္း ေျပာပါတယ္။ အေျခအေနေတြက
ေျပာင္းလဲသြားပါတယ္။ "ျမစ္ႀကီးနားမွာ ကင္မရာေတာင္ ကိုင္ခြင့္မရွိတဲ့အတြက္
ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ ဒီေရာက္လာတယ္ဆိုတာ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ သိထားၿပီးပါၿပီ" လို႔
သူကေျပာပါတယ္။
"ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ ဘာလုပ္ခ်င္တယ္ဆိုတာကို သိခ်င္ပါတယ္၊ ဒါမွ
စီစဥ္ေပးလို႔ရမယ္" ဆိုၿပီး သူကဆက္ေျပာပါတယ္။ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ဘက္က
အခ်က္သံုးခ်က္ ေတာင္းဆိုပါတယ္။ ေရွ႕တန္းစခန္း သြားခ်င္တယ္။ ဒုကၡသည္စခန္းကို
သြားခ်င္တယ္။ ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ဂြမ္ေမာ္ (ဒါမွမဟုတ္) စစ္ပိုင္းဆိုင္ရာ
အဆံုးအျဖတ္ေပးႏိုင္မယ့္သူကို ေတြ႕ခ်င္တယ္။ အစရွိတဲ့ သံုးခုကို
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ေတာင္းဆိုခဲ့ပါတယ္။
"လိုင္ဇာမွာ ဓာတ္ပံု႐ိုက္လို႔ မရတဲ့ ေနရာဆိုတာ မရွိဘူး။ ေမးလို႔ မရတဲ့ ေမးခြန္းဆိုတာ မရွိပါဘူး"
KIO ႏွင့္ Jade Land ကုမၸဏီတို႔ ပူးေပါင္းေဖာက္လုပ္ထားသည့္ ျမစ္ႀကီးနား ဗန္းေမာ္လမ္းပိုင္း စီမံကိန္းမွတ္တိိုင္ကို ေတြ႔ရစဥ္။
KIA ျပန္ၾကားေရး အရာရွိက ေျပာခဲ့တာပါ။ ဒီအခ်ိန္မွာ ေမးခြန္းတစ္ခုကို
ေမးလိုက္ပါတယ္။ အမ်ားျပည္သူအသံုးျပဳေနတဲ့ ရထားလမ္း၊ ကားလမ္းေတြကို KIO က
ဘာေၾကာင့္ ဖ်က္ဆီးသလဲဆိုတဲ့ ေမးခြန္းပါ။
"ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ေဖာက္ခဲ့တဲ့
လမ္းေတြ၊ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ေဆာက္ခဲ့တဲ့ တံတားေတြ၊ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ အခ်ိန္မေရြး
ျပန္ေဆာက္ေပးလို႔ ရပါတယ္။ စစ္ေရးအရ ဒါေတြကို မလုပ္ရင္ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔
ဌာနခ်ဳပ္ကို အလံုးအရင္းနဲ႔ ၀င္တိုက္လိမ့္မယ္"
ဒီလိုအရာေတြကို သူတို႔ မလႊဲမေရွာင္သာ လုပ္ခဲ့ရတယ္၊ လုပ္တဲ့အခါမွာ
အလံုးစံု ပ်က္စီးေအာင္ မလုပ္ခဲ့ဘူး။ အစိုးရတပ္ယာဥ္တန္း၊ ရိကၡာပို႔ေဆာင္မႈ
ရက္အနည္းငယ္ အဟန္႔အတားျဖစ္ေအာင္ တံတားတစ္ျခမ္းတည္းကို
ပ်က္စီးေအာင္လုပ္တယ္လို႔ သူကေျပာပါတယ္။ စစ္ဗ်ဴဟာအရ သူတို႔လုပ္ရတယ္လို႔
ေျပာလာတာေၾကာင့္ ေစာဒကတက္စရာ မရွိေတာ့ပါဘူး။ ဆဒံုးလူသတ္မႈကိစၥ အတြက္လည္း
သူတို႔မွာ အေျဖရွိေနခဲ့ပါတယ္။
"ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ နယ္ေျမထဲကို ေရာက္လာတဲ့အတြက္ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ေကာင္းေၾကာင္းေရးရမယ္လို႔
မေျပာခ်င္ဘူး။
ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ကိုယ္တိုင္ ေလ့လာပါ။ ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ကိုယ္တိုင္ ၾကည့္ပါ။
မီဒီယာဆိုတာ အမွန္တရားကိုပဲ ေရးရမယ္ဆိုတာ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ နားလည္ပါတယ္။
သမၼတႀကီးလည္း စတုထၴမ႑ိဳင္ဆိုၿပီး ေျပာထားတာပဲ" လို႔ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၃၀ ရက္ေန႔မွာ
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ကို လဂ်ားယန္ စစ္ေျမျပင္ ေခၚသြားတဲ့ KIA ျပန္ၾကားေရး
စစ္ဗိုလ္တစ္ဦးက ေျပာခဲ့တာပါ။
လဂ်ားယန္ကို သိမ္းျပီးျဖစ္လို႔ လဂ်ားယန္ စစ္ဆင္ေရးကိုသာ
ရပ္ျခင္းလား။ ပန္၀ါဘက္မွာ တိုက္ပြဲေတြ ဆက္ျဖစ္ေနမလား။ ဖားကန္႔ဘက္မွာ
တိုက္ပြဲေတြ ဆက္ျဖစ္ေနမလား။ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္ တစ္ခုလံုးအတြက္ ထိုးစစ္ရပ္ျခင္း
မဟုတ္ဘူးလား။ ေဒသခံေတြက သိခ်င္ေနပါတယ္။ တိုက္ပြဲေတြ
ဆက္ျဖစ္ေနဦးမယ္ဆိုရင္ေတာ့ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္မွာ ပ်ံ႕လြင့္ေနတဲ့ ယမ္းေငြ႔ေတြဟာ
လြင့္ျပယ္ဦးမွာ မဟုတ္ေသးပါဘူး . . .
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ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၃၀ ရက္ေန႔မွာေတာ့ လဂ်ားယန္ စစ္ေျမျပင္ကို ေရာက္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။
တပ္မေတာ္ ဂ်က္တိုက္ေလယာဥ္ေတြရဲ႕ ပစ္ခတ္မႈကိုလည္း ျမင္ခဲ့ၾကရပါတယ္။
အဲဒီေန႔မွာပဲ KIA ရဲ႕ ေရွ႕တန္းတပ္စခန္း ပိြဳင့္ ၇၇၁ ကို တပ္မေတာ္တပ္ေတြက
သိမ္းယူခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ပြိဳင့္ ၇၇၁ လက္လႊတ္လိုက္ျခင္းက လိုင္ဇာလံုျခံဳေရးအတြက္
စိုးရိမ္စရာ ျဖစ္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ဒီစိုးရိမ္မႈက ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၃၁ ရက္ေန႔မွာ
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ကို လိုင္ဇာကေန ထြက္ခြာေပးဖို႔ အေၾကာင္းဖန္လာခဲ့ပါတယ္။
"ကိုယ့္အသက္ကိုယ္ အာမခံၿပီး ေနမယ္ဆိုရင္ေတာင္ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ နယ္ေျမထဲမွာ
ျဖစ္ေနတဲ့အတြက္ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔မွာ တာ၀န္ရွိေနပါတယ္။ အခုခ်ိန္က စိုးရိမ္ရတဲ့
အေျခအေန ျဖစ္သြားပါျပီ။ ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔အတြက္ ဆက္ျပီး မကူညီႏိုင္တာကို
ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ ေတာင္းပန္ပါတယ္။ မီဒီယာကို အားကိုးပါတယ္။ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔
ျငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးရဖို႔ မီဒီယာတစ္ခုတည္းကပဲ လုပ္ေဆာင္ႏိုင္ေတာ့မယ္ဆိုတာ
သိေနပါတယ္။ ေနာင္တစ္ခ်ိန္မွာ ျပန္ဆံုခ်င္ပါေသးတယ္" လို႔ KIO
ျပန္ၾကားေရးအရာရွိက ထပ္ခါတလဲလဲ ေတာင္းပန္ရင္း ေျပာၾကားခဲ့ပါတယ္။
အစိုးရဘက္က တိုက္ပြဲသတင္းေတြကို ဘာမွမေျပာတဲ့အခ်ိန္မွာ လိုင္ဇာဘက္ကို
သတင္းေထာက္ေတြ ေရာက္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ သတင္းေရးခဲ့ၾကပါတယ္။ ကိုယ္တိုင္လည္း
အေျခအေနေတြကို ထိေတြ႕ခဲ့ရတယ္။ ေရးတဲ့သတင္းေတြက ဘက္လိုက္ခဲ့ၾကတာ မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။
"မမွား သို႔ေသာ္ မမွန္" ဆိုတဲ့ အေျခအေနတစ္ရပ္မွာ ဘက္ႏွစ္ဖက္စလံုးက
အမွန္တကယ္ ပြင့္လင္းျမင္သာမႈရွိခဲ့မယ္ဆိုရင္ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔ရဲ႕ ေရးသားမႈေတြက
ပိုၿပီး သက္ေရာက္မႈ ရွိမွာပါ။ တစ္ဖက္က ပြင့္လင္းျမင္သာမႈရွိၿပီး တစ္ဖက္က
ပြင့္လင္းျမင္သာမႈ မရွိရင္ေတာ့ ဒါဟာ ကြၽန္ေတာ္တို႔အတြက္ ခက္ခဲတဲ့
အေျခအေနပါပဲ။
ဇန္န၀ါရီလ ၁၈ ရက္ေန႔မွာ တပ္မေတာ္တပ္ေတြက လဂ်ားယန္ကို သိမ္းႏိုင္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ ညပိုင္းမွာေတာ့ သတင္းထုတ္ျပန္ေရးအဖြဲ႕က သတင္းထုတ္ျပန္ပါတယ္။
ကခ်င္စစ္ပြဲ စစ္ရွိန္ျမင့္တဲ့ေနရာမွာ လဂ်ားယန္၊ ပန္၀ါ၊ ဖားကန္႔
စတဲ့ေနရာေတြမွာ တိုက္ပြဲေတြ ျဖစ္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ လဂ်ားယန္နဲ႔ ပန္၀ါဘက္မွာျဖစ္တဲ့
တိုက္ပြဲေတြက ပိုၿပီး အရွိန္ျမင့္ခဲ့တယ္။ ေလေၾကာင္းတိုက္ခိုက္မႈေတြ
ပါ၀င္ခဲ့တယ္။
လဂ်ားယန္ကို သိမ္းျပီးခ်ိန္မွာ လဂ်ားယန္ေဒသ နယ္ေျမရွင္းလင္းမႈ
စစ္ဆင္ေရးကို ဇန္န၀ါရီလ ၁၉ ရက္ေန႔ နံနက္ ၆ နာရီအခ်ိန္မွာ ရပ္ဆိုင္းမယ္လို႔
ေျပာခဲ့ပါတယ္။ လဂ်ားယန္ကို သိမ္းျပီးျဖစ္လို႔ လဂ်ားယန္စစ္ဆင္ေရးကိုသာ
ရပ္ျခင္းလား။ ပန္၀ါဘက္မွာ တိုက္ပြဲေတြ ဆက္ျဖစ္ေနမလား။ ဖားကန္႔ဘက္မွာ
တိုက္ပြဲေတြ ဆက္ျဖစ္ေနမလား။ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္တစ္ခုလံုးအတြက္ ထိုးစစ္ရပ္ျခင္း
မဟုတ္ဘူးလား။ ေဒသခံေတြက သိခ်င္ေနပါတယ္။ တိုက္ပြဲေတြ
ဆက္ျဖစ္ေနဦးမယ္ဆိုရင္ေတာ့ ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္မွာ ပ်ံ႕လြင့္ေနတဲ့ ယမ္းေငြ႕ေတြဟာ
လြင့္ျပယ္ဦးမွာ မဟုတ္ေသးပါဘူး။
ဆက္စပ္ေဆာင္းပါးမ်ား
ယမ္းေငြ႕ေဝဆဲ ကခ်င္ေျမ
ယမ္းေငြ႕ေဝဆဲ ကခ်င္ေျမ(၂) |
ခ်င္းမုိင္(မဇိၥ်မ)။
။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုႏွစ္က ပင္လံုစာခ်ဳပ္ ခ်ဳပ္ဆိုရာတြင္ ဦးေဆာင္ခဲ့သူ ဟုိဝါး ဒူဝါ
ခြန္ဖုန္း Howa Duwa M.Hkun Hpung ၏ သား ဟုိဝါး ဒူဝါေဇာ္ဂမ္ Howa Duwa Zau
Gam အား ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးႏွင့္ ပတ္သက္၍ ၎၏ အျမင္မ်ားကို
သိရွိႏိုင္ရန္ မဇိၥ်မက ဆက္သြယ္ ေမးျမန္းခဲ့သည္။ 
